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In the well-studied cryptographic primitive 1-out-of-N oblivious transfer, a user retrieves a single
element from a database of size N without the database learning which element was retrieved.
While it has previously been shown that a secure implementation of 1-out-of-N oblivious transfer is
impossible against arbitrarily powerful adversaries, recent research has revealed an interesting class
of private query protocols based on quantum mechanics in a cheat sensitive model. Specifically, a
practical protocol does not need to guarantee that database cannot learn what element was retrieved
if doing so carries the risk of detection. The latter is sufficient motivation to keep a database provider
honest. However, none of the previously proposed protocols could cope with noisy channels. Here
we present a fault-tolerant private query protocol, in which the novel error correction procedure is
integral to the security of the protocol. Furthermore, we present a proof-of-concept demonstration
of the protocol over a deployed fibre.
Uncertainty in quantum mechanics can be used to
provide security in cryptographic applications, allowing
quantum cryptographic protocols to relax the typical as-
sumptions required for security (e.g. an adversary with
limited computational power), or even avoid them al-
together. The use of quantum information has proven
extremely successful for key distribution,for which quan-
tum key distribution (QKD)[1–3] can allow two parties
to communicate over a public channel with information
theoretic security (i.e. security against an adversary with
arbitrarily powerful computational capability, including
quantum computers). The application of quantum infor-
mation theory to other cryptographic tasks is an inter-
esting topic both because of the insight offered into ca-
pabilities of quantum versus classical information coding,
and because of the possibility of developing new practical
cryptographic protocols with improved security. Indeed,
there are various proposals and experimental demonstra-
tions of quantum cryptographic primitives such as secret
sharing[4, 5], coin-flipping[1, 6, 7], bit commitment[8, 9],
and oblivious transfer (OT)[9–13].
When considering cryptographic protocols for deploy-
ment, a protocol must ultimately satisfy the following
two criteria:
1. Security: The protocol must have a rigorous se-
curity analysis based on reasonable assumptions
about the adversaries. A strong justification must
exist for believing that these assumptions are true.
2. Implementability: The protocol must be imple-
mentable with existing technologies, and must
function in the presence of loss and noise (which
are inevitable in a realistic implementation).
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However, initially proposed protocols often do not meet
both requirements, and in particular often do not con-
sider loss and/or noise in the quantum channel. Indeed,
of the above mentioned protocols, only the bit commit-
ment and OT protocols of ref. 8, 9 are simultaneously
loss- and noise-tolerant, and thus are candidates for real-
world implementation.
In the case of oblivious transfer, it has been shown that
if both parties possess a universal quantum computer it
is impossible to simultaneously guarantee that the user,
Ursula, can reliably retrieve only a single element while
ensuring that the database provider, Dave, has absolutely
no knowledge of which element was retrieved[14]. How-
ever this does not mean a practical protocol cannot exist.
First, note that the security criterion allows for reason-
able assumptions about the computational capabilities of
the dishonest party (e.g. restricting the adversary from
having a universal quantum computer). Indeed, classi-
cal OT protocols also rely on one of two assumptions —
that at least some fraction of the intermediaries used to
perform the query are trustworthy[16, 17], or that the ad-
versary has limited classical computational resources[15].
In particular, a quantum protocol has been proposed
based on the assumption that the adversary has lim-
ited noisy quantum storage[9] (which precludes the ad-
versary from possessing a universal quantum computer).
However, new developments (e.g. improvements in com-
putational methods[19, 20] or in quantum memory[21–
26], respectively) may make these assumptions difficult
to justify in the long term. Second, it may be accept-
able in practice to relax security conditions of OT —
that is, one can allow the user to learn more informa-
tion from the database, and/or the database may be
able to gain some information about the query. Sev-
eral quantum protocols have been proposed in this vein
based on a cheat sensitive model[10–13], in which the
database provider is kept honest by the possibility of
being caught cheating. (This type of security can be
sufficient if users wish to purchase information privately
2TABLE I. Comparison of the ability of various protocols for private queries to meet the two criteria for deployment (security
and implementability). Note that the cheat sensitive security model may offer the possibility for security with no additional
conditions since the impossibility proof[14] may not apply.
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from a database who spends significant effort gathering
and analyzing data, e.g. to make recommendations to
investors, as the database must maintain a high quality
of service[12].) In this setting, the protocol need not pre-
vent the database from gaining any information about
the user’s query, hence protocols may exist in which the
assumptions are easier to justify, or in which no assump-
tions are required at all. A brief comparison of the prop-
erties of the above mentioned protocols for OT and pri-
vate queries, as well as the protocol we present in this
work is given in Table I, and we review these protocols
in further detail in the Supplementary Information.
In this work, we propose a private query protocol based
on the protocols of ref. 12, 13, retaining the advantages
of those works while addressing the remaining obstacle
to meeting the implementability criterion. This is ac-
complished using a novel error correction algorithm, in
which the algorithm and its associated parameters are
tailored to provide the desired level of security in the
private query protocol. Furthermore, we note that the
novel error correction procedure used to provide fault-
tolerance also provides additional opportunities for Ur-
sula to verify Dave’s honesty, thus enhancing the cheat
sensitive property of the protocol. Hence, we show that
error correction is not simply necessary to meet the im-
plementability criterion, but is integral to the security
criterion as well.
RESULTS
As in ref. 12, 13, we implement a cheat sensitive private
query protocol based on the SARG04 Quantum Key Dis-
tribution (QKD) protocol[27]. The functionality of the
protocol can be described as implementing probabilistic
n-out-of-N OT — that is, Ursula will, on average, learn
the value of n¯ bits (where n¯ is small) of the database
with high confidence (for brevity, we often simply de-
scribe such bits as being known to Ursula). She will also
have probabilistic knowledge of other bits of the database
(i.e. she can guess their value with better than 50% prob-
ability). In this scheme, a private query on an N -bit
database is made possible using an N -bit oblivious key
(for simplicity, we consider each element of the database
to be a single bit) generated by the quantum protocol, in
which the goal is to ensure that Ursula knows, on average,
n¯ bits of the oblivious key, whose positions are unknown
to Dave. In the following sections, we give a description
of the protocol for generating an oblivious key and using
it to perform private queries, give an overview of the er-
ror correction procedure, and then conclude with a brief
discussion on security.
Description of the protocol
A detailed description of the honest protocol for per-
forming a private query is as follows (see Figure 1 for a
graphical representation of the protocol):
1. Dave generates two long strings of classical bits uni-
formly at random, and records their values. Each
string should be ≈ kN
t
bits in length, where k is
a parameter determined by the previously agreed-
upon error correction procedure (to be discussed
later), N is the length of the database, and t is the
transmission of the link between Ursula and Dave.
2. Dave uses each pair of classical bits generated above
to choose a quantum state from a set of four previ-
ously agreed upon non-orthogonal states (shown in
Figure 1), and prepares qubits accordingly. A ran-
dom bit from the first string determines whether
the state is prepared in the 0-basis (spanned by
|ψ0〉 and |φ0〉) or the 1-basis (spanned by |ψ1〉 and
311 0 001 · · · 11
01 0 100 · · · 01
φ
1
ψ
1
φ
0
ψ
0
φ
0
φ
1 · · · φ1ψ1
Database (Dave)
· · ·ψ1 φ1 φ1 φ0 φ0 ψ1 ψ0 φ1
¬ · · ·¬ ¬ ¬
¬ · · ·¬ ¬ ¬¬ ¬ ¬ ¬
qubits detected
11 0 001 · · · 11
01 0 100 · · · 01
11 1 010 · · · 00
01 1 001 · · · 10
ψ or φ
φ
1
ψ
1
φ
0
ψ
0 · · · ψ1φ1ψ1 φ1
4.
3.
2.
1.
1 1 00 · · · 111 1
5.
11 1 010 · · · 00
1
1
0
01 1 001 · · · 01
11 0 100 · · · 01
00 0 111 · · · 01
1
0
1
1 000 · · · 000 0
111 · · · 1011 1
0 0 111 · · · 110
⊕ subset parities
? ? 0?? · · · ??1
6.
? ? ??1 · · · 0?1
10 1 010 · · · 01
01 1 110 · · · 00
0 · · · 0111010⊕
01 0 011 · · · 01
shift
encrypted database
01 0 011 · · · 01⊕
? · · · 0???0? 1
7.
User (Ursula)
2θ
φ
0
ψ
1
ψ
0
φ
1
Legend
k
N
kN
raw key
oblivious key
sifted key
oblivious key
sifted key
sifted key
detected qubit¬
very low error probability1
moderate error probabilty0
database element0
very high error probabilty?
⊕ parity operation
FIG. 1. Graphical representation of the private query protocol. The steps indicated on the left margin correspond to the steps
described in the text.
|φ1〉), and the corresponding random bit in the sec-
ond string determines whether the ψ or φ state in
each basis is chosen. The first random string forms
Dave’s raw key, for which the bit values correspond
to the bases in which he prepared the qubits.
3. Dave sends the qubits encoded into single photons
to Ursula using a possibly lossy and noisy quantum
channel.
4. Ursula makes projection measurements using either
the 0- or 1-basis, chosen uniformly at random, and
records the measurement bases and the results. Ur-
sula publicly announces the cases in which she de-
4tected a photon, and Ursula and Dave both discard
all the events in which Ursula failed to detect the
photon. The protocol proceeds to the next step
once Ursula has succeeded in detecting kN pho-
tons. Dave keeps the corresponding kN bits from
his raw key to form his sifted key.
5. Dave publicly announces his second string of ran-
dom bits (used to select whether he encoded the
qubits into a ψ or φ state), which, combined with
knowledge from Ursula’s measurements (and, for
the moment, assuming a noiseless channel), al-
lows her to conclusively identify whether the state
was encoded in the 0- or 1-basis with probability
pc =
sin2(θ)
2 . Note that when Ursula’s measure-
ments yielded inconclusive results, which occurs
with probability pi = 1 − pc, she gains probabilis-
tic information about the basis. This information
can be quantified by the probability that she incor-
rectly identifies the basis, ei =
cos2(θ)
1+cos2(θ) . A noisy
channel will affect the probabilities pc, pi, and ei,
as well as result in a non-zero error rate for conclu-
sive measurements, denoted ec. Like Dave, Ursula
associates classical bit values to the quantum states
based on the basis, and forms her sifted key using
the most likely values of the bits given her mea-
surement results.
6. Dave divides his sifted key into N k-bit blocks, and
computes each bit of his oblivious key as the par-
ity of the k bits in each block (the parity is 0 if an
even number of the k bits is 1, and 1 otherwise).
He publicly announces which bits form each block.
In addition, according to a previously agreed upon
error-correcting code, he also sends the parities of
several subsets of the k bits to Ursula. Using this
information, along with her sifted key and knowl-
edge of whether the measurements were conclusive
or inconclusive, Ursula computes the most likely
value of each oblivious key bit, as well as the prob-
ability that this value is incorrect, denoted ek. The
error-correcting code is selected such that Ursula
will only have a high confidence (or low ek) in n¯
bits on average, where n¯ is typically a few bits. If
Ursula does not learn any bits of the protocol (due
to its probabilistic nature), the protocol must be
restarted.
7. Ursula selects a shift value that aligns one of the
bits she knows in the oblivious key to the bit in
the database that she wants to know. She com-
municates this shift value classically to Dave, who
applies the shift to his oblivious key, and then
uses it to encrypt the database using the one-time-
pad[28]. He then sends the encrypted database to
Ursula, who can only decrypt the bits for which
she knows the corresponding oblivious key bit. If
Ursula knows multiple bits of the oblivious key she
will learn multiple bits of the database. However,
the shift only allows her to select the location of
a single bit of the database, with the remaining
learned bits distributed randomly.
Error-correcting codes for private queries
Let us now examine step 6 of the protocol in more
detail. Our error correction procedure (see Supplemen-
tary Information for a full description) is inspired by syn-
drome decoding of error-correcting codes such as Ham-
ming codes[29], which can operate on a few bits at a time.
However, it is important to note that in the context of
private queries error correction is integral to determining
how much information Ursula learns about the oblivious
key, creating unique requirements that made it necessary
to investigate and design novel error-correcting codes and
error correction procedures. In particular, the goal when
designing an error-correcting code for private queries is
not to simply maximize the probability of successful de-
coding as it is in standard communications applications.
Rather, a specific success probability is desired in order
to ensure that Ursula only learns a few bits of the oblivi-
ous key. Furthermore, to prevent Ursula from learning a
large amount of probabilistic information about the re-
maining bits of the key, it is desirable to keep ek as high
as possible in those cases in which decoding does not
succeed.
In addition there are two main technical differences be-
tween error correction in private queries and in commu-
nications. First, note that in order to recover the value
of the oblivious key bit, Ursula need only determine the
parity of the k-bits, and not the individual values of the
k bits as would typically be the case for error correc-
tion. Hence, the error correction procedure seeks the
most likely parity of the k-bit block, and successful de-
coding does not depend on having a high probability of
identifying the correct values of the k-bit block as long
as it is possible to identify whether an even or odd num-
ber of errors occurred. Second, the input bits can be
divided into those with low error rate (conclusive mea-
surements), and those with very high error rate (incon-
clusive measurements). We note that it is the interaction
of this latter property with the short block lengths used
(k ≤ 10) that allows uncertainty to be maintained after
error correction, thereby limiting the amount of informa-
tion that Ursula learns about the database.
The error-correcting codes used in this work are tai-
lored based on the experimental parameters (i.e. con-
clusive and inconclusive probabilities, pc and pi and the
associated error rates ec and ei) in order to achieve the
goals discussed above. In order to quickly evaluate error-
correcting codes, we define two thresholds, tU and tD.
When ek ≤ tU, Ursula considers the oblivious key bit
to be known. When ek ≤ tD, Dave considers Ursula to
have significant partial information about that bit. These
thresholds should be selected based on the requirements
of the application. In this work, we use tU = 10
−3 and
5tD =
1
3 . In order to reduce the probability of error in Ur-
sula’s oblivious key bit below her threshold (i.e. ek ≤ tU),
the error correction process must sufficiently reduce ek
when her quantum measurements succeeded in obtain-
ing a large amount of information about the k bits (i.e.
when most or all measurements were conclusive). How-
ever, the error correction will also reduce ek if several
measurements were inconclusive. Hence, the error rate
for inconclusive measurements, ei, is of particular impor-
tance to the fraction of bits for which ek ≤ tD. With this
in mind, a smaller angle between states (characterized by
θ as shown in Figure 1) has, in addition to those benefits
noted in ref. 13 (i.e. reduced quantum communication,
improved database security, and better control over the
number of bits Ursula learns), the benefit of reducing
the partial information from inconclusive measurements.
However, there is a trade-off between these benefits and
the fact that the error rate for conclusive measurements
is also increased due to a reduced signal-to-noise ratio,
making it more difficult to achieve ek ≤ tU. A detailed
description of the selection of our error-correcting codes
is given in the Supplementary Information.
Security of the protocol
Let us now discuss how the steps in the above pro-
tocol contribute to security, beginning with a discussion
of user privacy. User privacy is protected by the cheat
sensitive property of the protocol, which allows a dishon-
est database to be detected. This property stems from
step 4 of the protocol as Ursula randomly selects be-
tween two possible (non-commuting) measurements and
does not announce which measurement she performed.
Her security thus stems from the complementarity prin-
ciple as her interpretation of her measurement results is
dependent on her choice of measurement basis, with the
protocol designed such that the classical bit value she as-
signs to each result is perfectly correlated with her basis
choice (see step 5 and the Supplementary Information
for more details). In the case that Dave is honest (and
for the moment, assuming a noiseless system), Ursula’s
classical bit values for conclusive measurements will also
be perfectly correlated with the classical bit values Dave
used to select which quantum states he encodes. If Dave
is dishonest, and supposing he can send a state such that
Ursula’s measurement is conclusive regardless of which
measurement basis she chooses (a realistic attack is ana-
lyzed in the Supplementary Information), Ursula’s inter-
pretation of her measurements remain unchanged, hence
her classical bit values are still perfectly correlated to
her choice of basis. Since this choice is never revealed to
Dave, he does not know which bit value she obtains. This
leads to the cheat sensitivity in the protocol, as the dis-
honest database may be detected during error correction
(since he sends parity values uncorrelated with Ursula’s
classical bit values), or after completion of the protocol
since he may send incorrect query results. Furthermore,
note that the error correction procedure in step 6 only
involves one-way communication from Dave to Ursula,
hence Dave gains no information regarding the results of
the error correction procedure.
On the other hand, Ursula’s limited knowledge about
the oblivious key stems from the superposition principle
in quantum mechanics. Specifically, note that in step 2
Dave prepares qubits in non-orthogonal states, and that
Ursula can thus not deterministically distinguish between
these states. As such, Ursula’s measurements only give
her limited information, even after Dave reveals some
information about which state he sent in step 5. Fur-
thermore, note that Ursula must declare which bits were
lost during transmission (or detection) in step 4, prior
to receiving classical information indicating whether a
ψ or φ state was sent. This makes the protocol loss-
tolerant while ensuring that Ursula cannot choose which
bits to keep based on whether her measurements were
conclusive or inconclusive, even if she uses a heralded
quantum memory to delay her measurements until after
step 5. Note that in step 6, Ursula does have the ability
to restart the protocol if the results are unfavorable as
Dave cannot verify whether she indeed learned no bits of
the oblivious key. However, choosing an error-correcting
code such that n¯ is a few bits ensures that the proba-
bility for Ursula to not know any bits is very low, and
allows Dave to abort the protocol after a small number of
declared failures by Ursula (preventing her from repeat-
edly declaring failure until she obtains a very favorable
result).
Furthermore, a dishonest user may gain an advan-
tage by deviating from the honest protocol. It has been
shown that Ursula could perform an unambiguous state
discrimination (USD) measurement[30, 31] in order to
slightly improve her probability of conclusive measure-
ments, which allows her to learn a few additional bits
of the oblivious key[12]. However, this comes at the ex-
pense of gaining no information about the bit value (i.e.
ei = 0.5) when the USD measurement gives inconclusive
results. While this probabilistic information was not pre-
viously considered useful[12, 13], it is an important input
to the error correction process. Thus, the effectiveness of
this attack is reduced in the presence of error correction,
and our analysis in the Supplementary Information shows
that in some cases performing a USD measurement actu-
ally reduces the number of bits of the oblivious key that
Ursula learns as compared to the honest measurements.
Note that only individual USD measurements have been
considered, and coherent attacks (e.g. an optimized USD
measurement on the k qubits that form each oblivious key
bit) remain an interesting open question.
We also note that Ursula and Dave are adversarial in
nature in the protocol, and thus may not cooperate when
estimating the error rate in order to select an appropri-
ate error-correcting code. An error-correcting code that
is not well suited to the actual error rate in the system
will either result in Ursula learning too few or too many
bits of the oblivious key, but does not impact user secu-
6rity. Hence the database does not have any motivation to
falsify the error rate, but the user would like the database
to think the error rate is larger than it is in reality, leading
to the selection of an error-correcting code that gives her
more information. In our analysis (detailed in the Sup-
plementary Information), we find that Dave can ensure
that he has a reasonable level of security by determining
the error rate of devices under his control (potentially by
intentionally introducing noise) and selecting an error-
correcting code accordingly. In addition, even if Ursula’s
devices introduce some additional error that Dave does
not account for in his security analysis, the protocol is
still successful for her.
Experimental and simulated performance of our
protocol
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FIG. 2. Diagram of the experimental setup. The database
(Dave) uses a computer and field-programmable gate-array
(FPGA) to control the generation of polarization qubits via an
attenuated laser diode (LD1 and ATT) and polarization mod-
ular (PM). Quantum frames[32] (sequences of strong light for
timing and stabilization) are generated by a second laser diode
(LD2) and merged using a polarizing beam-splitter (PBS).
Light is transmitted from Dave to Ursula through a 12.4 km
dark fiber link with 4.5 dB loss between SAIT Polytechnic
and the University of Calgary. Ursula splits off 10% of the in-
coming light (90/10 BS) to a photodiode (PD) used to detect
the quantum frames. The 50/50 BS is used to passively select
a random measurement basis. The apparatus for each basis
consists of a polarization controller (PC), a PBS, and two
single photon detectors (SPD) to make the projection mea-
surement. Upon detecting a quantum frame, Ursula’s FPGA
triggers the SPDs and initiates data collection by the com-
puter, or polarization compensation, as appropriate.
The experimental and simulated results for these codes
are shown in Table III. The simulated results correspond-
ing to our experiment are derived from Monte Carlo sim-
ulations taking into account the variation in the param-
eters shown in Table II. Figure 3 compares the distribu-
tion of the results over the 104 queries performed in the
µ = 9.5 ± 0.47 case with the simulation results, show-
ing good agreement between the two. Note that in both
experimental cases, no errors were observed in the bits
learned by Ursula (i.e. for which ek ≤ 10
−3), with a total
of 45 bits learned in 11 queries when µ = 0.95 ± 0.047
and 405 bits learned in 104 queries when µ = 9.5± 0.47.
TABLE II. Parameters for the private query protocol as mea-
sured in our experiment with standard detectors, and simu-
lated for low-noise detectors. The value of θ (including stan-
dard deviation) is measured using classical light. For the
probabilities of conclusive measurements, pc, and error rates
for conclusive and inconclusive measurements, ec and ei, the
standard error expected based on Poissonian counting statis-
tics for the 107 bits in each query is negligible compared to
the observed variations across the queries performed. The ob-
served standard deviations are attributed to time-varying er-
ror in the alignment of the measurement bases at the receiver
as a result of channel instability. Note that the measurement
results for the µ = 9.5± 0.47 case show more variation in the
parameters than for the µ = 0.95 ± 0.047 case due to short-
term fluctuations that are averaged out by the long data col-
lection time needed to acquire the 107 bits per query in the
µ = 0.95 ± 0.47 case.
standard detectors low-noise detectors
µ (photons) 0.95± 0.047 9.5± 0.47 1
θ (◦) 35.6± 0.49 35.6 ± 0.49 25
pc (%) 16.1± 0.29 16.1 ± 0.93 9.22
ec (%) 4.4± 0.59 4.6± 0.38 1.91
ei (%) 41.24± 0.08 41.3 ± 0.64 45.12
k (bits) 10 10 9
We performed an experimental demonstration of pri-
vate queries over a 12.4 km fiber link between the Univer-
sity of Calgary and SAIT Polytechnic, using our BB84[1]
QKD system[32] (with a small modification to the hard-
ware to set θ = 35.6◦ ± 0.49◦ — all other differences
between our protocol and BB84 QKD are in the classi-
cal post-processing). Our experimental setup is shown in
Figure 2 (see ref. 32 for a detailed description). Note that
our demonstration uses weak coherent pulses rather than
single photons, and hence database privacy requires the
assumption that Ursula is not able to exploit pulses con-
taining multiple photons (adapting the protocol for weak
coherent pulses, e.g. using decoy states as in QKD[33–
36], remains an open question, and we discuss this pos-
sibility further in the Supplementary Information). We
consider a database size of N = 106 and, based on mea-
sured error rates for our system, an error-correcting code
with k = 10 was selected, thus requiring 107 measured
qubits per query. Note that we did not consider k > 10
due to computational constraints when searching for the
best possible construction of the error-correcting code.
A total of 11 queries was performed using a mean num-
ber of photons per pulse of µ = 0.95 ± 0.047 to show
that the protocol can function at the single photon level.
In this setting, our system took approximately 4.5 hours
to accumulate the 107 bits of data needed for one pri-
vate query. In order to quickly collect statistics, we re-
peated the experiment with mean number of photons
per pulse increased to µ = 9.5 ± 0.47, performing 104
queries. While the multi-photon emissions at this µ are
likely to compromise the security of the protocol if Ur-
sula monitors the pulses outside Dave’s laboratory, this
value corresponds to ∼ 0.95 photons per pulse at the de-
7TABLE III. Experimental and simulated results for the quantum private queries. The following figures of merit are used: the
average number of bits learned by the user per query, n¯, the average proportion of the database where the user has significant
partial information (i.e. ek ≤ tD), m¯, and the failure probability (i.e. that the user learns zero bits), P0.
µ = 0.95± 0.047 µ = 9.5± 0.47 low-noise
experimental simulated experimental simulated simulated
n¯ (bits) 4.1± 2.4 3.2± 1.1 3.9± 3.1 3.5± 1.9 4.35
m¯ (%) 6.1 ± 0.25 6.1± 0.25 6.3± 1.4 6.3± 1.3 0.96
P0 (%) 9.1± 9.1 8.8 8.7± 2.9 9.4 1.29
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FIG. 3. Histograms for the information gained by the user in the 104 queries performed in the µ = 9.5 ± 0.47 case. a) The
number of bits learned by the user. b) The percentage of the database of which the user learns significant partial information.
In both figures error bars for the experimental results represent one standard deviation assuming Poissonian counting statistics,
and the blue crosses show the expected distribution obtained from Monte Carlo simulations.
tectors, ensuring that multi-photon detection events do
not skew the detection statistics. The measured param-
eters that determine the performance of the protocol are
shown in Table II (note that the experimentally mea-
sured parameters at both mean photon numbers are the
same to within one standard deviation), along with pa-
rameters for a theoretical simulation of what could be
achieved using state-of-the-art detectors[37, 38]. These
detectors allow for significantly reduced noise (they fea-
ture dark count rates ≈ 100 Hz), and, in the case of
ref. 37, detection efficiencies up to 93%. With the im-
proved signal-to-noise ratio, we select the parameters of
the protocol to be θ = 25◦ and k = 9.
In addition, our simulation results show that the pri-
mary obstacle to improving database security in the pro-
tocol is noise in the system, which can be greatly reduced
by state-of-the-art single photon detectors. These detec-
tors can also improve the rate at which queries can be
performed by almost an order of magnitude because of
their higher detection efficiencies. Further improvement
of this rate is straightforward, as QKD systems can easily
be adapted to perform this protocol. A state-of-the-art
BB84 QKD system has shown that data can be accumu-
lated at a rate of 106 to 107 bits per second, depending on
the distance between Ursula and Dave[39]. For the pa-
rameters in our experimental demonstration, this would
allow one private query to be performed every few sec-
onds. The amount of data required can also be reduced
by repeating a short oblivious key over a longer database
and then applying a shift as before to allow Ursula to
select the desired bit. This would allow queries to be
performed more often, or equivalently, allow queries to
be performed on a larger database in the same amount
of time. However, this comes at the expense of database
security, as the user is able to learn additional bits for
each repetition of the key (though not in locations of her
choice, as only a single shift value is communicated). We
also note that a modification to the protocol of ref. 12
has recently been proposed that reduces the amount of
quantum communication required[40], however applying
this modification to our protocol is not straightforward.
DISCUSSION
We have proposed and demonstrated, over deployed
optical fibres, a quantum protocol for private queries us-
ing the cheat sensitive model. This first demonstration of
private queries in a real-world setting was made possible
by the development of a protocol which integrates a novel
error correction procedure. Our analysis of this protocol
has shown that error correction plays a pivotal role in
the security, both in terms of controlling how much in-
formation the user learns, and in providing the ability for
Ursula to detect a dishonest database. While our security
8analysis is currently limited to several specific attacks, it
is important to note that the error correction should be
viewed as an important tool for tailoring the amount of
information learned by the user, and hence may be adapt-
able to a more general scenario where Ursula makes more
powerful measurements. In this general view, database
security stems from the fact that quantum mechanics al-
lows a protocol to be designed where the user cannot
extract full information about the quantum states sent,
and error correction allows the extracted information to
be processed into an oblivious key with the desired distri-
bution of information for private queries. Furthermore,
quantum mechanics allows such a private query protocol
to be set up such that the correlation between Ursula
and Dave’s classical raw key bits is destroyed if Dave
can control which bits of the oblivious key Ursula learns.
Hence, the methods presented in this work should pro-
vide a strong basis for the further development of cheat
sensitive quantum protocols.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors thank M. Jakobi, M.V. Panduranga Rao
and C. Erven for useful discussions, V. Kiselyov for tech-
nical support, SAIT Polytechnic for providing laboratory
space, and acknowledge funding by NSERC, Quantum-
Works, General Dynamics Canada, iCORE (now part of
AITF), AITF, CFI, and AAET.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
REVIEW OF OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER AND PRIVATE QUERIES
An ideal 1-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocol simultaneously guarantees that (a) that the user, Ursula, is able
to retrieve a single element from the N -bit database, and (b) that the database provider, Dave, cannot gain any
information about which element was retrieved. However, it has been shown that, assuming a universal quantum
computer, if a protocol meets condition (b) then condition (a) implies that Ursula can access every element of the
database[14]. As such, it is impossible for a protocol to implement ideal oblivious transfer without making assumptions
in the security model. Alternatively, the class of protocols we refer to as private queries avoids the impossibility proof
by implementing functionality similar to 1-out-of-N OT. Such protocols offer a reduced level of privacy up front,
but this reduction in privacy may allow secure protocols using assumptions that are easier to justify, or in which
no assumptions are required at all. In this section, we briefly review protocols for oblivious transfer and private
queries.[14]
In classical information theory, protocols for OT rely on one of two assumptions — that at least some fraction
of the intermediaries used to perform the query are trustworthy[16, 17], or that the adversary has limited classical
computational resources[15]. The former assumption can be difficult to assess, as one must both believe that the
intermediaries will not collude with each other, and that their infrastructure is secured against attacks. The latter
assumption is shared with today’s public key cryptography infrastructure, and is hence well justified in the short
term. However, in the long term, the security of such systems can be compromised by advances in algorithms (e.g.
ref. 19) or hardware such as a quantum computer[20].
A quantum 1-out-of-2 OT protocol has also recently been proposed using the noisy-storage model[9], where it
is assumed that the dishonest party has a limited ability to store quantum information, and that the amount of
information that can be faithfully stored decreases over time due to noise in the quantum memories (note that this
protocol is loss- and fault-tolerant, as quantum memories are not required by the honest protocol). Since quantum
memories are a basic component in a universal quantum computer, this assumption means that the proof that ideal
OT is not possible[14] does not apply. Thus, perfect privacy is possible under this model, and this has indeed been
shown in the protocol of ref. 9. An experimental demonstration of the protocol has also recently been performed[18],
showing that it meets the implementability criterion. As with the classical OT protocols relying on assumptions about
the adversaries computational capabilities, this assumption is well justified in the short term given current quantum
memories. However, there is no fundamental principle limiting the adversaries ability to store quantum information,
and recent advances in quantum memories[21–26] threaten the validity of this assumption in the long term.
The private queries approach to OT using cheat sensitivity was first proposed in ref. 10. This protocol does not
satisfy condition (b) above, since a dishonest database could gain complete information about which element Ursula
retrieved. However, the protocol still offers security for Ursula as she has, in principle, the potential to detect Dave’s
attempt to gain information about her query, thus discouraging Dave from cheating. Note that condition (a) was
also not satisfied, as a dishonest user could sacrifice her ability to verify Dave’s honesty in order to obtain a small
number of additional elements (although, this is not a significant loss of privacy for the database if N is large).
An experimental proof-of-principle demonstration of this protocol was subsequently performed[11], however, as Dave
could hide his attempts to cheat if there was significant transmission loss and/or errors in the quantum channel, the
protocol is not practical under realistic conditions. Ref. 12 then proposed a probabilistic n-out-of-N OT protocol
9based on the SARG04 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocol[27], which was then generalized[13]. This protocol
allows Dave to gain information about Ursula’s query, but only at the risk of introducing errors into the element
Ursula retrieved, thereby allowing a dishonest database to be detected. The protocol also did not satisfy condition
(a) above as Ursula gains probabilistic information about elements of the database she does not request. Interesting
features of this protocol are the ability to tolerate loss in the channel, as well as the fact that it is simple to implement
using existing QKD technology. However, noisy channels were left as an open question, preventing implementation
of the protocol in realistic scenarios. Finally, our protocol proposed in this work represents the first cheat sensitive
protocol to be both loss- and fault-tolerant, making it suitable for implementation in a realistic environment.
QUANTUM STATE IDENTIFICATION
In our protocol, the database provider, Dave, encodes each qubit into one of four randomly chosen quantum states,
|ψ0〉, |ψ1〉, |φ0〉 or |φ1〉, as shown in Figure 4. The user, Ursula, measures each qubit in either the 0-basis, spanned by
|ψ0〉 and |φ0〉, or the 1-basis, spanned by |ψ1〉 and |φ1〉. After these measurements, Dave tells Ursula whether each
qubit was encoded into one of the ψ states or one of the φ states. In order to demonstrate the state identification
process, suppose Ursula measured in the 0-basis, and Dave declares that he sent one of the ψ states. If Ursula’s
measurement result was |φ0〉, she knows Dave could not have sent |ψ0〉 as these two states are orthogonal. Hence
Dave must have sent |ψ1〉. This is a conclusive result, and occurs with probability pc =
sin2(θ)
2 . Alternatively, if
Ursula’s measurement result was |ψ0〉, she only knows that the state was more likely to have been |ψ0〉 than |ψ1〉.
This is an inconclusive result, occurring with probability pi = 1 − pc. As the two potential states are associated
with different classical bit values (as indicated by the subscripts), Ursula only gains probabilistic knowledge from this
measurement result. This corresponds to an error rate of ei =
cos2(θ)
1+cos2(θ) in the ideal case (i.e. when no other sources
of error are present).
ψ
0
φ
0
ψ
1
φ
1
2θ
FIG. 4. Quantum states used in the private query protocol shown on a plane of the Bloch sphere.
Let us now examine how this state identification process leads to user privacy, considering first the honest protocol.
In the above example where Dave sent one of the ψ states and Ursula measures in the 0-basis, note that Ursula can
only get a conclusive measurement result if Dave sent the |ψ1〉 state. If Ursula instead measures in the 1-basis, she can
only get a conclusive measurement if Dave sent the |ψ0〉 state. Hence, for any given qubit that Dave sends, Ursula’s
choice of measurement determines whether a conclusive result is possible — she never gets a conclusive result if she
measures in the same basis in which Dave encoded the qubit. Since she never reveals her choice of measurement basis
to Dave, he cannot know which of her measurements gave conclusive results.
Now, let us consider the case in which Dave is dishonest. In this case, Dave wishes to break the correlation between
Ursula’s choice of measurement basis and the conclusiveness of her measurement results. Ideally, he would like to
choose whether Ursula will get a conclusive or inconclusive measurement result, regardless of which measurement she
makes. For ease of discussion, we assume here that Dave can send a quantum state that accomplishes this goal (we
discuss a more realistic attack in Section ). Since Ursula is honest, she makes the same measurements as before, and
interprets them assuming Dave is honest. In the above example, in which Dave declares he sent one of the ψ states,
if Ursula measures in the 0-basis, she will either conclusively identify that Dave sent the |ψ1〉 state, or inconclusively
identify that Dave likely sent the |ψ0〉 state. If she instead measured in the 1-basis, she will either conclusively identify
that Dave sent the |ψ0〉 state, or inconclusively identify that Dave likely sent the |ψ1〉 state. Recall that the classical
bit values that form the raw keys in the protocol are given by the basis of the state that Ursula believes Dave sent
(and correspond to the subscripts in the ket notation). Thus, Ursula’s raw key bits are anti-correlated with her
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choice of measurement basis for conclusive results, and correlated for inconclusive results. Hence, if Ursula’s choice
of measurement basis does not determine whether a measurement is conclusive, it instead determines her raw key
bits. In this case, since she never reveals her choice of measurement basis, Dave cannot know her raw key bits. This
leads to the cheat sensitivity in the protocol as the fact that Dave has no knowledge of Ursula’s raw key bits may be
detected during error correction, and if not detected, results in incorrect query responses. A more detailed analysis
of the cheat sensitivity is given in Section .
ERROR CORRECTION
We use a parity-based forward error-correcting code operating on k-bit blocks (corresponding to the k bits used
to compute one oblivious key bit), where Dave sends the parity of several subsets of the k bits to Ursula. The
construction of the code is normally described as a parity check matrix, denoted H, and is known to both Ursula and
Dave. The parity computation for the jth oblivious key bit is then given by:
~pj = H~dj (mod 2) (1)
where ~pj is a vector of computed parity bits (which Dave sends to Ursula) and ~dj is a vector containing the k bits
that Dave uses to compute a single oblivious key bit. For each oblivious key bit, Ursula has a corresponding k-bit
vector, ~uj, in which each bit stems from a conclusive or an inconclusive measurement that have, respectively, error
rates of ec and ei. Ursula can estimate these error rates over the entire protocol by comparing the parities, ~pj, she
receives from Dave and the parities she computes locally using ~uj . Using these error rates, Ursula’s error correction
procedure for each oblivious key bit is as follows:
1. Rule out those combinations of values for the k bits that are not consistent with the values for ~pj received from
Dave.
2. Divide the remaining possibilities into two sets — those that correspond to an oblivious key bit of 0, and of 1.
3. Based on the measurement results and estimated error rates, calculate the probability that each combination of
values for the k bits is correct. The set with the higher total probability determines the most likely value of the
oblivious key bit.
4. Compute the probability of error in the oblivious key bit, ek.
Note that Ursula can significantly reduce the computation required for error correction by performing this procedure
only if almost all of the k bits were measured conclusively. In doing so, she only performs error correction if there is
a possibility that the result will satisfy ek ≤ tU.
The error correcting codes used in this work are given by:
H35.6 =


1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1

 (2)
for θ = 35.6◦ and
H25 =


1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1

 (3)
for θ = 25◦. They were selected using an exhaustive search of potential error-correcting codes for k ≤ 10. The
probability distribution for ek is computed for each code based on the parameters in Table 2 of the main text, and
the selected codes provide a low probability for ek ≤ tD (indicating a small amount of information leakage to Ursula)
as well as a suitable probability for ek ≤ tU (ensuring that Ursula learns a few bits of the oblivious key on average).
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Note that both matrices are in reduced row echelon form (i.e. no 1’s appear below the leftmost 1 in any row). This
is due to the fact that the possible k-bit vectors remaining after step 1 of the error correction process (i.e. consistent
with the parity information received from Dave) are given by the possible solutions of the system of linear equations
in Eq. 1, hence any error correction codes that have the same reduced row echelon form behave identically in the error
correction process. The search space was thus limited by only considering matrices in reduced row echelon form.
REQUIREMENTS FOR SECURITY
The security of the experimental results presented in Table 3 and Figure 3 of the main text hold given that the
dishonest party is limited to non-quantum attacks (e.g. an arbitrarily powerful classical computer, which would be
sufficient to break computational protocols using classical information such as [15]). Furthermore, results for the
security of the protocol against several quantum attacks are presented in the Section . Note that these limitations on
the attacks a dishonest party can perform are a result of the current security analysis of the protocol, and may not
be required in general. It remains an open question as to what limitations on the dishonest party, if any, are required
to achieve a sufficient level of security. Based on the attacks we have studied, we believe that at a fundamental
level, the security of the protocol stems from the complementarity principle (protecting the user’s security) and the
superposition principle (protecting the database’s security). In addition, we note that the error-correcting code in
our protocol can be selected in order to provide less information to Ursula in order to compensate for an increased
information gain from more powerful quantum measurements. Thus, it may be possible to adopt such measurements
as the legitimate procedure for the user, provided that the measurements are feasible technologically.
We also note that the security results are valid only if certain requirements are met. These requirements are listed
below, beginning with those that are required in general, followed by those that are imposed by the current security
analysis:
1. Ursula’s and Dave’s laboratories are secure (i.e. no information leaves their laboratories except as specified in
the protocol). (Required for any protocol.)
2. Quantum theory is correct and complete. (Required for any quantum protocol.)
3. The dishonest party is limited to the attacks covered in the current security analysis (see Section ).
4. In our experimental demonstration, it is also necessary to assume that the user is not able to take advantage
of multi-photon pulses that result from using a source of weak coherent pulses. While this assumption can
be avoided if Dave uses a single photon source, the implementation of weak coherent pulses is much simpler
from a technological perspective. Thus, it is desirable for the protocol to be secure for weak coherent pulses
without the need for additional assumptions. The decoy state techniques used in QKD [33–35] provide security
against an adversary capable of exploiting multi-photon pulses. However, these techniques cannot be directly
applied in cases where the two parties are adversarial, as is the case in private queries, and must be modified to
account for the fact that the two parties need not be honest in the protocol [36]. However, it is not clear that
the techniques in ref. 36 can be applied directly to our protocol. In particular, Ursula may gain an advantage
by manipulating the aggregate statistics of the decoy state protocol by conducting an attack (e.g. by lying
about detections) during a subset of the protocol while acting honestly for the remaining subset. Analyzing and
adapting decoy state techniques for our protocol is thus an interesting open question. It may also be possible
for Dave to base his estimate of the additional information that may have been extracted from multi-photon
pulses on a characterization of his source. Regardless of how Dave quantifies Ursula’s information gain due to
multi-photon pulses it can be accounted for by selecting an appropriate error-correcting code. If the information
gain is sufficiently small, the protocol can provide a suitable level of database security while maintaining a high
success probability for the user.
CHEATING STRATEGIES
In this section we discuss the attacks on individual qubits proposed in [12, 13]. The discussion below shows that
the error correction step provides improved security for the protocol against these individual attacks. Optimization of
error correction in view of coherent attacks remains an interesting open question, as does an analysis of fully general
quantum attacks and an information theoretic treatment of our protocol. Furthermore, we comment on the issue
of error rate estimation between adversarial parties. As example cases for these discussions, we consider the mean
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parameters (θ, pc, ec, and ei) measured with µ = 0.95± 0.47 using standard detectors and the simulated parameters
for low-noise detectors (see Table 2 in the main text). For the measured parameters, we do not consider the observed
variances since they are specific to the system used to implement the honest protocol.
User Privacy
Let us first consider an attempt by the database to determine which piece of information Ursula is interested
in. Recall that our protocol does not prevent a dishonest database from gaining some information about Ursula’s
query, but is cheat sensitive in that it gives Ursula the possibility of detecting such an attack. Performing the attack
described below does not require any additional technology, as it simply requires Dave to send quantum states that
either maximize or minimize the probability, pc, that Ursula will believe her measurement was conclusive [12]. In
order to determine Ursula’s query, Dave seeks to have Ursula learn only a single bit of the oblivious key whose position
is known to him, thus he maximizes pc for the k bits that form one oblivious key bit in an attempt to convince Ursula
that she knows a particular bit of the oblivious key. He then minimizes pc elsewhere in an attempt to prevent Ursula
from knowing other bits in the oblivious key, in positions unknown to him. As noted in [13], Dave’s ability to control
pc improves as the angle between the 0-basis and 1-basis, θ, is decreased, making the attack more powerful. However,
in both cases (i.e. maximization or minimization of pc), the quantum state Dave sends for this attack lies directly
between either pair of ψ or φ states shown in Figure 4, and thus Ursula will associate a bit value to the measurement
that is completely unknown to Dave. Hence, under this attack, Ursula receives a random bit value in response to her
query, leading to the cheat sensitive property in [12, 13] (and in our protocol), in which incorrect query results will
reveal Dave’s dishonest behavior (i.e. over time, Dave will acquire a reputation of providing poor query results).
Furthermore, in our protocol the error correction steps provide additional opportunities for Ursula to verify Dave’s
honesty, both weakening the above attack as well as providing the possibility of detecting the weakened attack prior
to Ursula revealing information about her query. Specifically, the consequence of Dave sending quantum states that
minimize pc (in order to prevent Ursula from knowing one or more bits of the oblivious key in random positions) is that
Ursula’s and Dave’s sifted keys are completely uncorrelated (i.e. they have error rates ec = ei = 50%). Additionally,
since Dave has no knowledge of Ursula’s sifted key, the parity bits, ~pj (see Eq. 1), that he sends for error correction
will be completely uncorrelated with the parity bits Ursula computes from her measurement results. This allows
Ursula to detect a cheating database, and abort the protocol. While this severely restricts Dave’s ability to ensure
that Ursula does not know bits of the oblivious key in random positions, it does not prevent him from attempting
to convince Ursula that she knows a bit in a particular position of his choosing in addition to any bits she learns
randomly (in this case, Dave is unsure if Ursula’s query corresponds to the position where he conducted the attack,
or to an unknown position that Ursula learned randomly). This is because Dave only needs to maximize pc in k bits
out of kN bits of the sifted key, which has a negligible effect on the overall error rates for large N . However, this
attack has a limited success probability, and if it fails, it may fail in a way that is suspicious to Ursula, again allowing
Ursula to abort the protocol (see below for a detailed example). Note that the above verifications occur after the error
correction step, but before the shift value is communicated, thus Dave gains no information about Ursula’s query if
the protocol is aborted.
To illustrate the possibility for Ursula to detect an attempt by Dave to convince her that she knows a particular
bit, we consider the parameters discussed above. For k = 10 and θ = 35.6◦, there is a 37.49% chance that Ursula
will believe all k bits are conclusive given this attack. For k = 9 and θ = 25◦, this probability increases to 64.93%.
However, for Dave to convince Ursula that she knows a particular bit of the oblivious key, it is not sufficient for her
to believe that all k bits are conclusive, as the error correction procedure must also indicate that her measurement
results are correct or correctable (i.e. the error correction procedure results in a error probability ek ≤ tU, where we
recall that we have selected tU = 10
−3 as the threshold below which Ursula considers a bit to be known). The attack
thus becomes more difficult with error correction, since the database must also send parity information to Ursula that
is consistent with her measurements. Since Dave’s bit values are completely uncorrelated with Ursula’s measured
bit values, the parity information that Dave sends is essentially random, and Ursula is unlikely to find a low value
for ek. In the above examples, Ursula finds ek ≤ 10
−3 with only 5.92% probability (for k = 10 and θ = 35.6◦) and
12.73% probability (for k = 9 and θ = 25◦), showing that this attack has a limited success probability. In addition,
the case in which Ursula believes all k bits were measured conclusively is of particular interest as it is very unlikely
that she will find a large probability of error in the oblivious key bit after error correction, ek, if the protocol was
performed honestly. However, in the above attack, Dave must send parity information that is uncorrelated with
Ursula’s measurement results, leading to a large amount of uncertainty during Ursula’s error correction process and
resulting in a high probability of finding a large value for ek. For example, when Ursula believes all k bits were
measured conclusively, for k = 10 and θ = 35.6◦, she expects ek ≥ 0.15 with 2.14% probability if Dave is honest, but
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this value increases to 40.63% given the above attack. For k = 9 and θ = 25◦, she expects ek ≥ 0.055 with 0.71%
probability when honest, and 65.63% with the attack. A large value for ek if all k bits are measured conclusively can
thus serve as an indication that Dave is attempting to cheat, and allows Ursula to abort the protocol. Furthermore,
even if the protocol proceeds and Dave is cheating (e.g. because Dave, by chance, sent consistent parity information),
Ursula’s and Dave’s oblivious key bits after error correction are still uncorrelated, as in the protocol of [12, 13]. This
ensures that the cheat sensitive property of the protocols in [12, 13] discussed above is preserved in our protocol.
Generally speaking, we note that the additional benefits provided by the error correction procedure are relevant
to other attack strategies as well. Ursula now has the ability to monitor the aggregate error rates in the system,
allowing her to detect any attack by Dave that has a significant effect on the overall error rates. Furthermore, the
need for the database to be able to send meaningful parity information during error correction provides an additional
hurdle for attacks that cause Dave to lose information about Ursula’s measurement results.
Database Privacy
On the other hand, a user attacking the protocol seeks to learn as many bits from the database as possible. One
method of doing so is to store the photons from Dave in a quantum memory until after he reveals whether he sent
a ψ or φ state, and then perform an unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurement [30, 31] to distinguish
which of the two remaining states was sent. However, as Dave only reveals information about a quantum state after
Ursula has declared that a photon has been detected, every photon that a dishonest Ursula declares as “detected”
contributes to her sifted key. As such, any photon that Ursula declares as “detected” but subsequently fails to detect
(e.g. because she could not identify when a photon was successfully stored in her quantum memory, or because of
loss occurring after the declaration) results in bits in the sifted key of which Ursula has no knowledge. Successfully
performing an USD attack thus requires a heralding signal indicating that a photon was successfully stored in the
quantum memory, and the ability to recall the photon from the quantum memory with near 100% efficiency. For
the following analysis, we assume a heralding signal in conjunction with a perfect quantum memory (i.e. one that
introduces no error into the quantum states, and has 100% efficiency; a realistic quantum memory, such as those
assumed in the noisy-storage model, would reduce the effectiveness of the attack), and that there are no other sources
of loss that reduce the success probability of the USD measurement.
If Ursula is able to perform an USD measurement, this allows her to maximize the probability that the quantum
measurements will give conclusive results. As shown in [12], the probability of conclusive results increases only
slightly when performing USD measurements, resulting in the user only learning a few more bits than when making
honest measurements. Furthermore, the advantage decreases as θ is decreased [13]. Additionally, in the presence
of error correction, the advantage of performing an USD measurement further decreases. This is because the USD
measurement gains no information from inconclusive results, essentially exchanging this information for an increased
probability of obtaining a conclusive result. However, the partial information from inconclusive results is useful
during error correction, and can even allow Ursula to know the value of the oblivious key bit in some instances
in which not all measurements were conclusive. As such, error correction can reduce the effectiveness of the USD
attack. Performing USD measurements when using the code with k = 10 and θ = 35.6◦ only increases the average
number of bits the user knows from n¯ = 3.89 to n¯ = 11.15 — a rather small gain for a database of 106 bits. For
the code using k = 9 and θ = 25◦, performing USD measurements actually decreases the average number of bits
the user knows from n¯ = 4.35 to n¯ = 1.00. This decrease is due to the fact that at this smaller value of θ, the
value of the partial information gained from inconclusive measurements outweighs the slightly improved probability
for a conclusive measurement offered by the USD measurement. Note that these results are based on having the
same error rate as for the honest measurements, which may not be a realistic assumption given that a different
measurement apparatus is required. The issue of error rates differing from those used to select the error-correcting
code is addressed separately below so as to isolate this effect from that of the USD measurement.
Error rate estimation
Finally, since Ursula and Dave have an adversarial nature in the private query protocol, accurately characterizing
the error rate in the system in order to select an error-correcting code is not straightforward. In particular, Ursula
would like the database to believe that the error rate is higher than in reality, as Dave would then select an error-
correcting code that gives her more information, allowing her to learn more bits from the database. To avoid this
problem, Dave can determine the amount of information a user will learn from the protocol based solely on the error
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TABLE IV. Comparison of simulation results for a user experiencing higher error rates than those used by Dave to select
an error-correcting code. The columns labeled “all” show experimental results obtained using standard detectors (θ = 35.6◦,
k = 10), or simulation results with improved detectors (θ = 25◦, k = 9), as taken from Tables 2 and 3 of the main text, and
represent the actual results of the protocol as influenced by noise due to all imperfections. The columns labeled “source only”
represent Dave’s predicted results for the protocol, based on an error rate estimation considering only noise introduced by his
source.
θ = 35.6◦, k = 10 θ = 25◦, k = 9
noise all source only all source only
pc (%) 16.1 15.9 9.22 9.14
ec (%) 4.4 2.5 1.91 1.38
ei (%) 41.24 40.89 45.12 45.11
n¯ (bits) 3.89 14.32 4.35 10.67
m¯ (%) 6.03 6.69 0.96 0.93
introduced by devices directly under his control. In fact, he can even choose to deliberately introduce additional
noise in order to provide the desired level of database security. Additional imperfections in the system would cause
the user to experience a higher error rate than Dave’s estimate, leading to her learning fewer bits than the database
predicts. To show that there is a regime that allows the protocol to succeed from the user’s perspective while still
providing good database security, we re-examine the error-correcting codes that we have considered thus far using
the parameters shown in the columns labeled “source only” in Table IV, where noise in the system has been reduced
compared to the original parameters in the main text (shown in the columns labeled “all”). Note that the effect of
the lower noise observed by the database is not just a lower error rate in the conclusive measurements, ec, in the
“source only” columns — the other parameters are affected as well. The error rate for inconclusive measurements, ei,
is affected by the same noise sources as ec, but the effect on ei is smaller as the error for inconclusive measurements
is dominated by uncertainty inherent in the quantum measurement. Hence, ei in the “source only” columns is only
slightly lower than in the “user” columns. The total number of conclusive results is reduced slightly as the number
of conclusive results recorded due to noise events is lower. Hence, the probability of conclusive measurements, pc, is
lowered slightly in the “source only” columns. Table IV also shows the results for the average number of bits learned
by the user, n¯, and the average proportion of the database for whic Dave considers Ursula to have significant partial
information, m¯, for the original parameters in the “user” columns, as well as for a lower error rate that can be used
to select the error-correcting code in the “source only” columns. As can be seen, the reduction in error rates does
not result in a large increase in the potential amount of information gained by a user who experiences no additional
error. Thus, it is possible for an error-correcting code that is selected based on local error rates to both provide the
database with good security and allow the protocol to be successful for a user experiencing higher error rates.
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